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Abstract
In this paper, I examine the effects of implementing tighter Intellectual Property Rights
in a model of International Trade. In my model, firms in different countries have the
choice of committing their resources to introducing new products (product innovation)
or to imitating and improving upon current products (process innovation). I analyze the
impact of stronger patents on innovation decisions, overall welfare and the distribution
of welfare among countries. I show that, depending on parameter values, firms in
developed countries (North) may altogether specialize in product innovation or may
attain incomplete specialization in the sense that some innovate and some imitate.
Welfare analysis will depend on the degree of specialization. In the case of incomplete
specialization, tighter IPRs increase the incentives for product innovation in the North
but, at the same time, increase the imitation done in the South. This finding is contrary
to the conventional argument that states the reverse for imitation rates. In the case of
complete specialization, stronger patents do not affect the rate of product innovation but
reduce the rate of imitation, and welfare is nonmonotonic in IPRs. Finally, I examine the
case of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and predict that stronger patents will increase
the FDI while lowering the wages worldwide.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last thirty years, there is an obvious trend towards the implementation of
stronger Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) worldwide. This trend started in developed
world, especially in the USA after the establishment of the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals. After the collapse of the Communist Block and increasing integration of
developing nations into the world economy, the USA and other developed countries have
been continuously pressuring other nations to follow their lead in implementing stronger
IPRs. Not only has the definition of what is patentable has broadened1, but countries
have started to harmonize with each other with regards an ever growing catalogue of
products that are subject to patents2.
Stronger IPRs have been one of the main topics of the Uruguay Round of trade nego-
tiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO). As a result of these negotiations,
agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) have been
signed by the members of the WTO. TRIPs set minimum standards for protection of
intellectual property and provides harmonization of policies between countries. Most
importantly it requires National Treatment, treatment of foreign and national applicants
equally as defined by the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.
Finally, thanks to the The Patent Cooperation Treaty, inventors can seek for worldwide
protection since 1970s.
The main motivation behind all this policy push by developed market economies has
1The most obvious example being software
2Many countries did not grant patents for pharmaceuticals until 30 years ago(Qian, 2007)
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2been helping the innovators to appropriate the fruits of their labor. The idea is simple:
patents create incentives for innovators at the expense of welfare costs arising from the
monopolies they create. So when one compares static costs of a monopoly created by
patents against dynamic benefits of more innovation you usually come up with an inverse
U shaped welfare curve as a function of some measure for patent strength (Nordhaus,
1969). Recently there has been a surge in literature that questions this framework
and has produced different results with regards to finding optimal patent policy. The
first problem arises from the way innovation is defined. Innovation is always thought
as the act of coming up with a completely new product. But a huge portion of R&D
efforts is done in order to enhance current products, by making them cheaper, or adding
new features to them. This is called the case of sequential innovation. In this regard,
stronger patents may create roadblocks for future enhancement of current products.
Scholars investigated the issue of compensation for the original innovator (Scotchmer,
1996), but problem evolved into questions of how not to prevent following innovations
through wrong and excessive patent rights (Bessen and Maskin, 2009) . Stronger IPRs
provides more protection and incentives for the first innovator but impairs the efforts
of those who follow3(Scotchmer, 1996; Bessen and Maskin, 2009).
Another issue facing the analysis of IPRs is the increasing relevance of international
trade and how it alters the welfare analysis conducted for a closed economy. On the one
hand trade spreads the benefits of innovations across countries while making it harder
for local innovators to appropriate the benefits. This encourages innovating countries
to argue for stronger patents in other countries. On the other hand, there is always
an incentive to impose weaker protection for foreign innovations as profits from patent
granted monopolies go abroad and consumer surplus that arises from weaker protec-
tion stay within the country. This may create incentives towards implementation of
weaker IPRs compared to optimum when countries act independently. This is the main
argument behind harmonization of IPRs throughout the world. But the optimality
of harmonization has been questioned as well and critics usually underscore that har-
monization brings too much protection compared to the optimum (Grossman and Lai,
3In their book The Case Against Intellectual Property, Boldrin and Levine (2008) advocate the
complete removal of IPRs. They discuss the case of the steam engine and how patents actually hindered
its further development and highlight the costs to the society. On the other hand Selgin and Turner
(2006) provides a rebuttal for Boldrin and Levine.
32004; Scotchmer, 2004).
This paper analyzes the effects of the implementation of stronger IPRs in context
of the two issues just discussed. Innovation is the decision of allocation of resources for
reaching different kind of ends: it may be about releasing a new product to markets,
or it may be about enhancing current products, making them cheaper and capturing
product lines (this is referred as imitation in the literature). Same resources can be
used for both “innovation” or “imitation”. Countries have different comparative ad-
vantages with regards to different kinds of innovations. Even though many developing
market economies are putting resources into Research and Development, they are seen
as failures in terms of creation of innovative economies. What is happening in fact is
that these economies are not failing but specializing in certain types of R&D, defined
as “Process innovations”. These are the follow up innovations to original product in-
novations. A Ricardian type of specialization in the world economy in types of the
R&D economies conduct arises thanks to International Trade. Currently, many de-
veloping nations are creating and organizing supply chains which do not exist in the
developed world and those nations are conducting research towards incremental inno-
vations (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011). OECD reports points to this fact as “too much
Development and too little Research” in case of China (OECD, 2008: 69).
In this paper I use the product cycle framework developed by Vernon (1966); Krugman
(1979); Grossman and Helpman (1991b). My paper is similar to Helpman (1993)’s. But
I divert from this framework by not just assuming the emergence of specialization pat-
terns but also explaining how they emerge. For this purpose I use the framework
provided by Saint-Paul (2002). This framework is rich in analyzing how resources for
innovation are allocated between different kinds of research in different countries with
different characteristics. In my paper innovation and imitation are not separate and
one dimensional activities for firms. Firms decide on the kind of research they want
to conduct, they are not bound to make only one type of research depending on their
location. As a result, different patterns or degrees of specialization between countries
arise. Welfare effects of stronger patent protection will be different in a world where
there is a complete specialization of innovation and imitation between countries and
in a world where there is incomplete specialization. In this sense I show that welfare
analyses done in product cycle models are usually incomplete.
4In the first and second sections of the following chapter, I introduce the model
and explain the possible equilibria and specialization patterns emerging in the world
economy. I show that countries with different capacities for novel-product innovations
cannot do both kinds of innovations at the same time. One country will always com-
pletely specialize. The existence of trade exacerbates the differences between countries
in terms of R&D they may conduct otherwise.
In the third section of the Chapter 2, I introduce patent reforms to model. I show
that depending on the kind of equilibrium an economy is in, patent reforms may have
unintended results. Reforms implementing stronger IPRs usually slow down the follow-
up innovator. They make it harder for the follow-up innovator to conduct research
and invent around existing patents and reduce the amount of imitation in the world
economy. But in our case, it may actually have an opposite effect depending on if
the developed market economy has incomplete specialization. In the case of incomplete
specialization, patents will induce firms in developed countries to put more resources into
novel-product research. More importantly, this will allow firms in developing market
economies to imitate more easily as they will have less competition in imitation and
they will have more products to improve upon. Moreover patents will push countries
towards more specialization. I show that increased IPRs in such a case can hurt welfare
in developing countries depending on parameters chosen, but this is possible only if they
hurt developed countries first. These results are contrary to standard argument that
states stronger patents will decrease imitation in developing countries, will more likely
to benefit developed market economies at the expense of developing countries.
In the case of complete specialization in R&D between countries (the case usually
analyzed in the product cycle literature), stronger patents may not have any impact
on the rate of novel-good innovation at all, yet they will alter the welfare distribution.
Unlike the previous case, here I show that tighter IPRs don’t increase the innovation,
but will decrease the imitation. For a range of parameter values I show that tighter
IPRs increase welfare in developed countries, but reduce overall welfare by reducing
the welfare in the developing market economies. Policy implications contrast sharply
between complete and incomplete specialization cases.
Then I discuss the difficulties that a developing market economy faces in promoting
Product innovation through subsidies.
5Finally the last part of the next chapter introduces Foreign Direct investment by
multinational firms and allows us to see how multinational firms react to different IPRs
regimes and how they change their investment decisions accordingly.
Chapter 2
Model
2.1 Setting
I consider a world economy with two freely trading countries and a continuum of indus-
tries indexed by j ∈ [0, Nt], Nt being the number (measure) of variety of goods available
at each instant of time t. The model is based on Saint-Paul (2002) model. Each good
is provided by one company who act as monopoly and each firm is only providing one
good.
There are two types of innovation activity; “Product Innovation” and “Process In-
novation”. Former is the action of introducing a novel product that was not being
produced before and latter consists of making the production of a novel product more
efficient. Two countries are differentiated by their capacity in terms of their product in-
novation; “North” being more capable of introducing novel products, i.e. their product
innovation rate per researcher is higher than “South”.
2.1.1 Households
Households worldwide share an identical preferences for differentiated products. Their
welfare equals the discounted flow of instantaneous utility u(t):
U =
∞∫
0
e−ρt lnu(t) dt (2.1)
6
7The static utility function takes the classic Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) form:
u(t) =
(∫ Nt
0
c(j, t)αdj
)1/α
, 0 < α < 1 (2.2)
In (2.2) c(j, t) denotes amount of differentiated product j that household consumes.
Nt represents the number (measure) of varieties available on the market at time t.
The representative household maximizes (2.1) subject to the following budget con-
straint:
∞∫
0
e−R(t)X(t) dt ≤
∞∫
0
e−R(t)Y (t) dt+A(0) (2.3)
whereX(t) and Y (t) are the individual flow of spending and income at time t, A(0) is
the value of assets households held at time zero and R(t) =
∫ s
0 r(s) ds is the cumulative
interest rate. I assume there is free international capital flow and same interest rates
prevail in both countries at all times.
The solution to inter-temporal maximization problem gives us:
X˙(t)
X(t)
= r(t)− ρ (2.4)
The allocation of expenditure across products at each point in time gives us the
instantaneous demand for variety j:
c(j, t) =
p(j, t)−σ∫ Nt
0 p(i, t)
1−σdi
X(t) (2.5)
where p(j, t) is the price of variety j at the time t and σ = 11−α is the elasticity of
substitution. We’ll define a world price index as:
P =
Nt∫
0
p(i, t)1−σdi
and normalize it to 1 for each time period t . Household income consist of wages
they earn and profits they acquire from firms as they are the owners of the firms.
Since we have normalized the overall price level to one at all times, we obtain the
8indirect utility function
lnu(t) = lnX(t)− lnP (t) = lnX(t) (2.6)
Instantaneous utility function is equal to spending at each period.
2.1.2 Innovation and Manufacturing Technologies
Labor is the only factor of production for both manufacturing and innovation. Both
North and South have a measure of 1 labor, out of which zi are researchers and 1− zi
are manufacturing workers. There are two types of innovation that can be undertaken
by researchers; product innovation which results in creation of blueprints for primary
goods that did not exist before (same as in Grossman and Helpman (1991b)) and process
innovation which involves introduction of secondary goods which are improvements upon
primary goods. Secondary goods are cheaper to produce and eventually replace primary
goods in the market . From customers’ perspective there is no difference if they consume
primary or secondary goods; they receive the same utility from consumption of same
quantities.
As a result, goods have two stages in their manufacturing cycle, first they are pro-
duced as primary goods and production of each unit of primary good requires 1 unit
of labor. Later they are exposed to further improvements in form of process innovation
and I call them as secondary goods afterwards. A unit of secondary good requires λ
units of labor to be produced, where λ < 1. Goods can be improved only once. Finally
goods are going to be obsolete at a rate of δ. Both secondary and primary goods get to
be obsolete at the same rate. As a result, some primary goods do not get to be improved
upon before they become obsolete.
Let zi1 indicate number of researchers working for product innovations in country
i, whereas zi2 indicates number of workers working for process innovation. We define
z1 = zN1 + zS1 as the total number of product innovators globally, and z2 = zN2 + zS2
as the total number of process innovators globally.
Similarly, let ni1 denote the number of primary goods being produced in country i,
and ni2 indicates number of secondary goods. ni = ni1 + ni2 is the number of goods
produced in each country i, and n1 = nN1+nS1 is the number of primary goods available
9to customers. n2 = nN2 + nS2 is the number of secondary goods. There is free trade;
every type of good is being offered to customers without any trade costs. At each point
in time t, nN(t) + nS(t) = n1(t) + n2(t) = Nt.
Product Innovation
One unit of researcher in country i creates γidt amount of novel goods if they work
dt amount of time. By assumption γN > γS , that does not necessarily mean that
researchers in North are more capable with coming up with new ideas. It says researchers
doing product innovation in North are able to transform the novel ideas they come
up with into actual products more rapidly. This difference between countries arises
mainly due to differences in institutional arrangements. One such difference may arise
in how such innovations are financed. As we will see, product innovation is a more risky
business compared to process innovation. Lack of a capable capital market that can
utilize sources like venture capital to finance risky innovations properly can contribute
to such a gap (Orman, 2008).
In any case, the reason for gap between two countries’ primary innovation capabilities
is beyond the scope of this paper. Once a primary product is innovated, its manufacturer
gains the monopoly rights to it, and sell it until its product is replaced by a secondary
innovation or becomes obsolete.
Process Innovation
Process innovation is described through a matching function the way it is described
Saint-Paul (2002), inspired from job matching functions from labor literature(Pissarides
(2000) ). Researchers can improve upon any good on the market regardless of the origin
of the good or researcher. In a state where there are z2 amount of process innovation
researchers working on n1 number of primary innovations, there are M number of
matchings (successes), where M is found via a matching function M :
M =M(n1, z2) =
(z2)
α (n1)
1−α
m
(2.7)
This function represents the congestion and decreasing returns that arise when there
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is increasing number of secondary innovation researchers.1 This matching function is
a generalized version of innovation functions used in Grossman and Helpman (1991a)
where α was taken equal to 0, or Helpman (1993) where α was taken equal to 1. One
crucial aspect of this paper will be to capture the process of decision of allocating
resources on different kinds of innovations. As a result z2 is a variable needs to be taken
into account. And just like in Helpman (1993), number of novel goods n1 is also a factor
that affects rate of replacement (imitation) of primary goods that needs to be taken into
account: Matching function captures positive spillover effect of a higher n1 for process
innovation, while decreasing returns to higher numbers of process researchers, z2. A
very low number of primary goods would mean very low returns to process innovation.
Variable m captures the idea of frictions arise that process innovators face. More
strongly enforced and more broadly defined patents increases m in this model2. One in-
terpretation for this is that patents is making it harder for followers to imitate and come
up with improvements upon new products. It will be harder for secondary innovators
to “invent around” the patented product stronger the patents are. This is in line with
the literature concerning sequential innovations. A stronger patent makes it harder for
others to follow up with improvements for the same good (Bessen and Maskin, 2009;
Hopenhayn et al., 2006). In this sense, stronger patent systems are implemented to
divert more resources to introduction of novel goods.
A researcher can create κdt number of secondary goods if they work dt amount of
time. κ is the arrival rate of secondary innovation that is endogenously determined
within the system via matching function M . Likewise we define the rate of replacement
of primary goods through process innovation as ν. We derive the values for κ and ν as
follows:
κ =
M(n1,z2)
z2
=
1
m
(
n1
z2
)1−α
ν =
M(n1,z2)
n1
=
1
m
(
n1
z2
)
−α
(2.8)
As a result of the structure of matching function, we have a mechanic relationship
1In Acemoglu and Cao (2010), same idea of congestion arises and they explain it as a result of
“fishing in the same pond; replication of ideas and efforts by different researchers”.
2This is similar to Helpman (1993), where tighter IPRs basically increased the friction to imitation
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between κ and ν expressed by what we will refer as matching frontier throughout paper:
(mκ)1/(1−α) = (mν)1/(−α) (2.9)
I assume that countries synchronize their patent system, enforce the same level of
protection. They also provide national treatment, which is a requirement of TRIPs3
agreement that was negotiated during Uruguay rounds. National treatment prevents
countries to discriminate against foreign goods when it comes to intellectual property
rights protection (World Intellectual Property Organization, 1968: 223-224).
Finally I assume that secondary good producers have monopoly powers as well.
Secondary good producers do not have to compete with each other as it is not profitable
to spend resources to improve the same primary good and get zero profits. I assume
that λ is significantly small that the secondary good producers are able to charge limit
monopoly price and drive the primary good producers out of the market. We can also
think that secondary goods producers are also receiving a patent, hence ensuring their
monopoly rights and avoiding a Bertrand competition with primary good producers.
Law of Motion for Variety of Goods
Finally let us sum the law of motions for the number of products available in the market:
∂n1
∂t
= − (δ + ν)n1 + γNzN1 + γSzS1
∂n2
∂t
= −δn2 + νn1 = −δn2 + κz2 (2.10)
∂N
∂t
= −δ(n1 + n2) + γNzN1 + γSzS1
Figure (2.1) represents flow rates for each type of good. At a steady state equilibrium
number of goods are stable, i.e. ∂n1∂t = 0,
∂n2
∂t = 0 and
∂N
∂t = 0. One thing to note
here is that, at a steady state equilibrium total number of goods N depends only on
the number of product innovators zi1 allocated by each country i. At a steady state,
N = γNzN1+γSzS1δ .
3
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Primary Goods Secondary Goods
γz1
n1 n2
δn1 δn2
κz2
νn1
Figure 2.1: Law of Motion for Goods
2.2 Market Equilibrium
We will be looking at the steady state equilibria only.
2.2.1 Prices and Wages
Taking into account demand function for a firm’s product that was given by (2.5), and
the fact that we normalized world price index to one, we get the demand equation
cj = Xp
−σ
j , where X is the total world expenditure on goods(We’ll indicate spending
in North and South as XN and XS respectively). Since firms are acting as monopolies
on goods they provide, their pricing decisions can be summarized as:
pj =

µwi if primary goodµλwi if secondary good for i = N,S (2.11)
where wi is the manufacturing wage rate in country i, and µ is the monopoly mark-
up over per unit cost of goods, with µ = σ/ (σ − 1). Compensation for researchers in
country i is indicated by fi.Then the flow of profits for manufacturer who is producing
primary goods in country i is given by:
pii1 = (µ− 1)Xw
1−σ
i µ
−σ (2.12)
whereas for secondary good producer it is:
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pii2 = (µ− 1)X (λwi)
1−σ µ−σ (2.13)
2.2.2 Earnings and Costs of a Firm
Net present value of expected earnings V are determined by the following functions for
primary and secondary goods manufacturers:
rVi1 = pii1 − (δ + ν)Vi1
rVi2 = pii2 − (δ) Vi2
for i = N,S. From which we find that:
Vi1 =
(µ− 1)Xw1−σi µ
−σ
r + δ + ν
Vi2 =
(µ− 1)X (λwi)
1−σ µ−σ
r + δ
(2.14)
The cost of creating a blueprint for a primary good in country i is Fi1 =
fi
γi
, whereas
cost of replacing a primary good with a secondary good is given by Fi2 =
fi
κ .
2.2.3 Finding the Equilibrium
Closed Economy
In order to talk about an equilibrium in a world where we have trade, we first describe
an equilibrium in a closed economy. We can use the same notation but just dropping
the notations for countries.
In a closed economy, value V of a firm has to be equal to cost of R&D of either product
and process innovations ,depending kind of good it is. As a result the conditions F1 = V1
and F2 = V2 need to be satisfied. This is a result of free entry assumption on the markets.
If blueprints are too cheap for either kind of goods (F1 < V1 or F2 < V2), demand for
the researchers will go up, driving the wages f up. Likewise cost of blueprints F can
not exceed expected earnings V , some of the prospective manufacturers will leave the
14
ν
κ
R
R
Matching
Frontier
Figure 2.2: Closed Economy Equilibrium
market. If we define RR = V1/F1V2/F2 , then we get:
RR =
λσ−1 (r + δ) γ
κ (r + ν + δ)
(2.15)
The free entry assumption in a closed economy requires RR = 1. RR = 1 curve
gives us values for (ν, κ) where V1/F1V2/F2 = 1.
Using RR = 1 and matching frontier equation (2.9), we find the equilibrium κ and ν
values in this economy. Then using equilibrium (ν, κ) values from this economy, we can
find prices, wages and earnings(p,w, f,X) that bring this economy to equilibrium and
allows us to solve for the equilibrium allocations4. Such an equilibrium is illustrated
in figure 2.2. In figure 2.2, if you pick a pair of values (ν, κ) above RR line, then
RR < 1, implying V1/F1 < V2/F2. In this case process innovation is more profitable,
and no product innovation is done. Similarly for any point below RR curve, we have
only product innovation in this economy, which contradicts with the fact that (ν, κ)
being nonzero (there has to be some process innovation going on). At equilibrium, both
happen as both will have to be equally profitable and we will be on RR curve.
4For each (ν, κ) value picked on RR = 1 we can find an equilibrium price vector (p,w, f) that ensures
not only the condition RR = 1, but also V1/F1 = V2/F2 = 1. On other points of RR, the V1/F1 = V2/F2
equilibrium will still hold for said prices, but we will lose the last part of the equilibrium; earnings to
cost ratio will not be equal to one.
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ν
κ
RN
RN
RS
RS
North-Process
South-Process
South-Process
North-Product
South-Product
North-Product
Figure 2.3: Innovation Regimes
Open Economy
In an open economy, we have a more complicated situation. There are three possible
scenarios:
1. North is doing both process and product innovation, South is specialized in process
innovation
2. North is specialized in product innovation, South is doing both process and product
innovation
3. North is specialized in product innovation, South is specialized in process innova-
tion
The reason for that is, RRN lies above RRS on the plane of (ν, κ). Therefore process
innovation is always relatively more profitable in South compared to North for any
given values of (ν, κ). Whenever South is doing product innovation, that necessarily
implies North is also doing product innovation. The result we get is that we won’t have
a case where both countries doing both types of innovations (or a case where South is
specialized in product innovation whereas North is specialized on process innovation).
Figure 2.3 describes the innovation regimes for countries. Countries will be doing both
kinds of innovations when equilibrium is on their respective RR curves. And they will
do the kind of research they are assigned when equilibrium is in the indicated zones
on the given figure. But of course some of the innovation zones on that figure are not
supported by any possible equilibrium.
16
The equilibrium of this system lies on either RRN , RRS, or the region that lies in
between. First one correspond to scenario 1, second one correspond scenario 2, and
last one correspond to scenario 3. It can’t lie above RRN as someone has to do some
product innovation or we won’t have any goods in this economy, or below RRS since
then it implies there is no secondary innovation. This contradicts with the fact that
(ν, κ) having positive values. Besides, looking at the matching function, we see that we
have the Inada Conditions being satisfied for the process innovations, i.e. the return
for the process innovation go to infinity as the number of process innovators go to zero:
lim
z2→0
∂M(n1, z2)
∂z2
= +∞
Aside from RRN , RRS and matching frontier itself, we’ll need one more condition
to locate the equilibrium (ν, κ). We need to be more specific about possible equilib-
rium points in full specialization case. For this, we look at the flow rates for goods.
At full specialization all southern researchers are process innovators and all northern
researchers are product innovators. From the law of motion equation (2.10) and steady
state condition for primary products, we get:
0 = − (δ + ν)n1 + γNz1
Then from (2.8), we get κz2 = νn1. Number of process innovations done by re-
searchers are equal to number of primary goods being replaced by secondary goods.
Combining these two equations gives us κ = νγNδ+ν
z1
z2
. Finally using the fact that at full
specialization z1 = zN and z2 = zS , we have the specialization condition:
κ =
νγN
δ + ν
zN
zS
(2.16)
This is a positive sloped line on (ν, κ) plane as can be seen on figure (2.4) as SS line.
When countries fully specialize, equilibrium (ν, κ) values have to lie on this line. Any
(ν, κ) values lying above this line indicates a situation where z1/z2 > zN/zS , which is
the case that some researchers from South is doing product innovation. Similarly any
(ν, κ) values lying below this line indicates a situation where z1/z2 < zN/zS , which is
the case that some researchers from North is doing process innovation.
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Figure 2.4: Equilibrium Locus
Now we can define the equilibrium locus of this economy. It can be seen from figure
(2.4). It is the bold line segment, labeled as ”ABCD” on the graph.
The equilibrium on the world economy determined by line segment ABCD and
matching frontier. There are three possible scenarios depending on where matching
frontier and equilibrium line intersect with each other. Economy may be fully specialized
and be on SS curve (on CB segment of equilibrium line). Or there are both types of
innovations being conducted by South while North is specialized on Product innovation.
In this case world economy is above SS curve as indicated, and since South will be doing
both product and process innovation, both activities have to be equally profitable in
South hence economy has to be on part of RRS curve that is above SS (on AB segment
of equilibrium line). Finally there may be both types of innovations being conducted
by North while South is specialized on Process innovation. In this case world economy
is below SS curve, and since North will be doing both product and process innovation,
both activities have to be equally profitable in North hence economy has to be on part
of RRN curve that is below SS curve (on CD segment of equilibrium line).
General Equilibrium
Finally we can quickly define a steady state general equilibrium for this economy. :
For i = N,S, given the prices and wages
{
{pj}
N=n1+n2
j=0 , wi, fi
}
, total expenditures
{Xi}, distribution of variety for primary and secondary goods {ni1,ni2}, distribution of
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researchers {zi1,zi2}, flow rates {κ, ν}; equilibrium allocation {cj}
N=n1+n2
j=0 will:
• solve the Household maximization problem:
• maximize the producers’ profits pij ∀j,
while
• Number of goods are stationary:
γNzN1 + γSzS1 = (δ + ν)n1
κz2 = νn1 = δn2
• Cost of creating a blue print for primary and secondary products are equal to
their expected lifetime profits,
• The following equations hold for production, spending and general price level
1− zN = nN1cN1 + nN2cN2λ
1− zS = nS1cS1 + nS2cS2λ (2.17)
X = pN1nN1cN1 + pN2nN2cN2 + pS1nS1cS1 + pS2nS2cS2
P = 1 = p1−σN1 nN1 + p
1−σ
N2 nN2 + p
1−σ
S1 nS1 + p
1−σ
S2 nS2
where ci1 and ci2 represents the amount each primary and secondary good being
produced in country i = N,S, and pi1, pi2 are their respective prices.
Full Specialization Case
World is in a full North-Product Innovation and South-Process Innovation equilibrium
depicted in many product cycle models such as Vernon (1966),Krugman (1979) and
Grossman and Helpman (1991b). This particular equilibrium is depicted in figure (2.5)
in our framework. In this case we have cN2 = cS1 = zN2 = zS1 = 0.
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2.3 Patent Policies
Now we can look at effects of certain policy changes, especially changes in patent policy
towards implementation of stronger intellectual property rights for the product innova-
tor. In this model, stricter patent policies are conducted through increasing the variable
m in matching function M . The idea is that, stronger patent policies make it harder
for process innovators and imitators to introduce secondary products to the market. It
is a friction introduced in the system to divert more resources to product innovation.
It is informative to look at the case of closed economy first to see how patent policy is
conducted within this framework, results of such policies. Then we will switch to open
economy case.
2.3.1 Closed Economy
In a closed economy, patents always divert more resources from process to product
innovation. A stronger patent system make product innovations relatively more prof-
itable at the expense of making it harder for follow up innovations to capitalize on their
improvements. Stronger patent protection shifts the matching frontier left.
In the new equilibrium after the reform, number of process innovators z2 declines,
and number of product innovators z1 increases
5. Less process innovators mean a higher
5To see why this is the case, suppose reverse is true. But then, unlike what happens on figure 2.6,
return per process innovator κ would have to decrease as a result of higher number of process innovators
z2, lower number of primary goods n1 and congestion this situation would create. For more formal proof
of results I mention in this part, please refer to Appendix
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Figure 2.6: Patent Reform in a Closed Economy
return per process innovator, i.e. an increase in κ, despite the existence of stronger
patents. As implied by equation (2.10) total variety of goods N and number of primary
goods n1 always increases. The effect on n2 is ambiguous. But we can say that as long
as κ is not too low, it decreases.
The effects on welfare is a little more complicated as expected. Using manufacturing
constraint, price normalization equations:
1− z = n1c1 + n2c2λ
P = 1 = p1n1 + p2n2
and inserting equilibrium prices and demand functions (equations 2.5 and 2.11) we
get the equilibrium values for wages and total income/expenditure:
w =
(
n1 + n2λ
1−σ
) 1
σ−1
1
µ
X =
(
n1 + n2λ
1−σ
) 1
σ−1 (1− z) (2.18)
It can easily be seen that welfare depend on variety of goods as well as amount of
consumption. If the gains from process innovations is not big enough (ie.λ is not small
enough), stronger patents increase the total variety and improve welfare.
As we know now, increasing patent protection increases the rate of improvement per
process innovator (κ) while decreasing the probability of being replaced by a secondary
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Figure 2.7: Welfare Effects of Patent Reform
good for primary goods(ν). This two rates have different effects on total welfare X.
Increasing κ as a result of stricter patent laws always improves welfare, on the other
hand effects of change in ν is less certain6. Stronger patents improve welfare through ν
as well as κ only when ∂X∂ν < 0. Solving the model tells us that
∂X
∂ν < 0 iff κ >
γ
(λ1−σ−1)
.
Below the cut point of κ = γ
(λ1−σ−1)
, stronger patent laws’ effects on κ and ν work against
each other. But above the cut point, stronger patents always contribute positively to
welfare (see figure (2.7)).
In an economy with low enough product cycle rate ν or high enough κ, stronger
patents lead the economy to a higher level of welfare. It is easier to make a case for
stronger patents in such an economy.
2.3.2 Open Economy
In an open economy effects of a patent reform that implements stronger protection
for primary goods are more complicated. If South is specialized on process innovation
completely, then North is either doing both kinds of innovation or specialized on product
innovation. Results of implementation of stronger patents to protect product innovation
being done in North depend on if North is completely specialized like South.
Incomplete Specialization
If the economy is at equilibrium on CD part of equilibrium line on figure 2.4, then
North is doing both kinds of innovations. We can find how much North is allocating
6In this economy, after all we have ∂κ
∂m
> 0 and ∂ν
∂m
< 0 as can be seen on figure 2.6
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towards each type of innovation in terms of (ν, κ) and other given parameters of the
economy using flow equations κz2 = νn1, n1 (δ + ν) = γz1 and z1+ z2 = zN + zS
7. The
allocation of researchers determine the number of goods being produced in both regions
(nN1, nN2 and nS2).
Finding the distribution of goods between regions allows us to solve for the welfare
and wage values for countries. Modifying equation (2.17), we get the relevant equations
to solve for X,wN and wS :
1− zS = nS2cS2λ
1− zN = nN1cN1 + nN2cN2λ
1 = p1−σN1 nN1 + p
1−σ
N2 nN2 + p
1−σ
S2 nS2
where values for price(p) and demand for goods(c) can be expressed in terms of
manufacturing wages and total welfare through equations (2.5) and (2.11). Then we get
the following system of equations:
1− zS = nS2Xλ
1−σ (µwS)
−σ
1− zN = nN1X (µwN )
−σ + nN2Xλ
1−σ (µwN )
−σ
1 = (µwN )
1−σ nN1 + (µλwN )
1−σ nN2 + (µλwS)
1−σ nS2
Finally solving for X,wN and wS we find the following values:
X = (1− z)
[(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
+
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ]σ/(σ−1)
wN =
[(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
+
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ]1/(σ−1) (
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
(2.19)
wS =
[(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
+
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ]1/(σ−1) (
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
Welfare and wages are monotonically increasing in number of goods being produced
(nN1, nN2 and nS2). We will call
(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
as the Northern contribution to
welfare, and
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
as the Southern contribution.
Stronger patent protection pushes North towards committing more resources on
7I will assume zN = zS = z for simplicity. Also in this case z1 = zN1, zS2 = zS, and zN1+ zN2 = zN .
A complete solution is provided in Appendix
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product innovation and less on process innovation8. Even though stronger patents
are introduced to increase the friction for process innovators, κ -return per process
innovator- increases in this economy. This happens because there will be less compe-
tition among imitators as patents get stronger. Researchers in Northern countries will
flock to product innovation as they will receive more protection and increase the number
of goods to be improved upon, leaving more fish in the pond with less fishermen for
other process innovators. This can be seen from figure 2.4, where economy is moving
along the CD part of equilibrium as patents get stronger, ν declining while κ increasing.
We can provide following proposition on distribution of production between coun-
tries, which will become crucial when we analyze welfare implications of stronger patents:
Proposition. nN1, nS2 and N are monotonically increasing with stronger patent pro-
tection, whereas nN2 is monotonically decreasing. n2 is an inverse U shaped function
of patent protection. It will increase up to some level of protection, but then decline.
Since South is completely specialized on process innovation on CD part of equilib-
rium line, return per process innovator in South increases as long as equilibrium does
not move to the zone where North also completely specialize. The conclusion we get
in this case is that even though stronger patents are implemented in South as well as
North, not only South does not start doing any product innovation, but also number
of goods being imitated per instance of time (κzS) increases in South, as well as the
number of products
(
nS2 =
κzS
δ
)
being produced in South.
Number of primary goods introduced to market per instance of time(γNzN1) in-
creases as a result of more product innovation being done in North, causing an increase
in n1 =
γN
(δ+ν)zN1. A higher n1 means more goods to work on for process innovators.
These two effects overcome the negative effect of increase in matching frictionm. On the
contrary, as zN1 increases, zN2 and nN2 monotonically declines. Total number of sec-
ondary goods (n2 = nS2 + nN2) being produced in this economy is an inverse u shaped
function of patent strength m, it increases up to some level of protection, but then it
declines.
Stronger patents increase the resources allocated on product innovation, and increase
the total number of goods available to consumers. In this specific case, from equation
8As m increases, ν declines. Effects of this change on distribution of goods and researchers is shown
in Appendix.
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(2.10), we know that N = γNzN1δ . As zN1 increases as a result of stronger patents, total
number of variety of goods also increases in this economy.
Proposition. nN1, nS2 and N are monotonically increasing with stronger patent pro-
tection, whereas nN2 is monotonically decreasing. n2 is an inverse U shaped function
of patent protection. It will increase up to some level of protection, but then decline.
Looking at the welfare equations (2.19), we see that contributions of nN1 and nS2
to total welfare are both positive as they increase as a result of stronger IPR pro-
tection, whereas declining nN2 has a negative contribution. A loss in total welfare is
only possible if losses from a decline in nN2 overcome the gains from both nN1 and
nS2. In such a scenario declining n2 not only decreases the Northern contribution to
welfare
(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
despite increasing nN1, but also counteracts the Southern
contribution to welfare,
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
.
Proposition. If total welfare X is declining as a result of stronger patent protection,
then Northern wages should be declining.
This is easy to see. Total welfare declines if only summation of
(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
and
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
declines. As nS is monotonically increasing in stronger patent pro-
tection,
(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
should be declining in such a scenario. Finally wN should
be necessarily declining, as it is the product of two declining numbers in this case.
Proposition. If southern wages are declining with stronger patents, then Northern
wages should be declining as well.
The equations for both wN and wS have the common part:
[(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
+
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ]
If wS is decreasing, that common part is declining for sure since
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
is
increasing with stronger patents. If that summation is decreasing as a result of tighter
IPR, then X is also decreasing. Finally from the previous proposition we know that as
X declines, wN also declines.
These last two propositions tell us that in case stronger patent protection has neg-
ative welfare effects, rather than the imitating South, North will be the first country
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to be negatively affected. Even though such a scenario is possible depending on initial
values chosen for the model, generally it can be inferred that stronger patent protection
improves the total welfare as the total variety of goods N increases .
Specialization
Things will be a little different in a world where there is complete specialization. This
is the BC segment on equilibrium line on figure 2.4 and the case discussed in many
product cycle models in literature. But in this particular model, stronger patents do not
push more researchers to do more product innovation, unless it does not move the world
economy to AB part of equilibrium where South will also start doing product innovation.
In this case implementation of stricter intellectual property rights will fail to spur any
new product innovation in world economy altogether. Results would be different if North
had the technology to switch some of manufacturing resources to more R&D. But share
of R&D in GDP has been a persistent number in developed countries, at least in short to
medium run (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011: 165).
In a world with complete specialization, z1 = zN , z2 = zS ,n1 = nN and n2 = nS .
Using the steady state flow equations n1(δ+ν) = γzN , n2δ = κzS like before, we obtain
the number of variety of goods as follows:
n1 =
γN
δ + ν
zN
n2 =
κ
δ
zS
We can eliminate κ from our equations using the specialization equation (2.16) (so
that ν will be the only variable that will determine final values of n1,n2,X,w and f).
Then we get the following equations:
n1 =
γN
δ + ν
zN
n2 =
νγN
δ (δ + ν)
zN (2.20)
In case of complete specialization, we will be on SS curve on figure 2.8. This time
when a stronger patent system is implemented, unlike the previous case, probability
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Figure 2.8: Stronger Patents in Open Economy
of secondary innovation per researcher κ will also decline since all that patent reform
do is to increase the friction variable m in the matching function, without changing
number of product innovators, z1 or process innovators z2 (assuming patent reform
is not strong enough to push economy to the zone where South will also start doing
product innovation). Using equation (2.20) we get the total number of variety of goods:
N = n1 + n2 =
γN
δ
zN (2.21)
It is easy to see that the total number of goods do not depend on any variables that
a patent reform would affect (Namely κ and ν). In this case, a stronger patent reform
will not change N , it will only alter the distribution of goods that are produced in North
and South.
How about the welfare? In order to analyze the effects of implementation of said
policies on welfare, we need to solve the equations for wN , wS and X. Modifying the
general equilibrium equations from (2.17), we get:
1− zN = n1Xw
−σ
N µ
−σ
1− zS
λ
= n2Xw
−σ
S µ
−σλ−σ (2.22)
1 = n1w
1−σ
N µ
1−σ + n2w
1−σ
S µ
1−σλ1−σ
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First two lines are manufacturing constraints for North and South. The last line
comes from P = 1. Solving for these equations we get:
X =
[
n
1/σ
1 (1− zN )
(σ−1)/σ + n
1/σ
2 (1− zS)
(σ−1)/σ λ(1−σ)/σ
]σ/(σ−1)
Finally, if we assume zN = zS = z, then we get:
X = (1− z)
[
n
1/σ
1 + n
1/σ
2 λ
(1−σ)/σ
]σ/(σ−1)
wN = n
1/σ
1
[
n
1/σ
1 + n
1/σ
2 λ
(1−σ)/σ
]1/(σ−1) 1
µ
(2.23)
wS = n
1/σ
2
[
n
1/σ
1 + n
1/σ
2 λ
(1−σ)/σ
]1/(σ−1)
λ(1−σ)/σ
1
µ
Total expenditure X and wages wN and wS all depend on number of goods that
countries manufacture: nN = n1 and nS = n2. From these equations we derive the
terms of trade and relative wages:
pN
pS
=
(
n1
n2
)1/σ
λ−1/σ
wN
wS
=
(
n1
n2
)1/σ
λ(σ−1)/σ
A stronger patent system will worsen the terms of trade and relative wages for South
as it will increase n1and decrease n2 as it can be directly inferred from these equations.
How about the level of welfare and wages? In the complete specialization zone,
increase in m (i.e. stronger patents) decreases both probability of success for process
innovators κ, and probability of being replaced for primary goods by secondary goods
ν.
Proposition. Patents have a positive effect on total welfare X, that is ∂X∂m > 0, iff
ν > λ−1
By solving the model we see that ∂X∂m = 0 iff ν = λ
−1. The total welfare is an inverse
U shaped function of patent protection m, and it has a maximum at ν = λ−1. A proof
is provided in Appendix. Implication of that is stronger patents improve welfare only
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when there is more than certain level of replacement (or imitation) of primary goods:
ν > λ−1. In such a case of “too much imitation”, improvement in total world welfare
as a result of increasing patent protection happens because marginal contributions of
gain from welfare improvements in the North is higher than the marginal losses from
the decline of welfare in the South.
Of course we have no guarantee for ν = λ−1 taking place on the interval BC on
figure 2.4 where full specialization equilibrium occurs. It may lie to the right or left of
BC interval depending on initial parameters. This uncertainty will have different policy
implications for world welfare.
Southern wages on the other hand will improve with stronger patents, that is ∂wS∂m >
0, if there is even more replacement of primary goods compared to the case for X just
discussed: ∂wS∂m > 0 iff ν > δ(σ − 1) + λ
(σ−1)/σν1/σσ. Here we need higher values of ν
compared to previous case to justify stronger patents for South; wS is maximized at a
higher value of ν compared toX. 9 . This is a more unlikely scenario to realize compared
to the stronger patents being good for X, it will only happen when Northern market is
so small that an improvement there will have a positive contribution to southern wages
wS as a result of increase in exports.
Finally stronger patents will improve northern wages, ∂wN∂m > 0 as long as replace-
ment (imitation) rate (ν) is not too low: ∂wN∂m > 0 iff λν
3/2 (σ − 1) + δνσ − λν1/σδ > 0.
This is a scenario that is more unlikely to realize compared to previous scenarios to
begin with. Wages in north will improve with less patents in the case of “too low ν”
only because gains from exports to south will improve northern wages despite the loss
of manufacturing to south in case of an extremely impoverished south.
These results are illustrated on figure 2.9. We have three cut points for ν, and
to the right of each cut point, indicated variable will improve as a result of stronger
patents10. Between A and C, patent reforms will improve wages in North at the expense
of Southern wages. But between B and C, welfare of world economy X will improve as
South is worse-off. In this case, a compensation from North to South might be a proper
9Which is in fact equivalent to saying ∂wS
∂m
= 0 iff ν = δ(σ− 1)+λ(σ−1)/σν1/σσ , ws has a maximum
at ν = δ(σ− 1) + λ(σ−1)/σν1/σσ. When we compare the critical points where ∂wS
∂m
= 0 and ∂X
∂m
= 0, we
find that it is higher for wS .
10Those cut points indicate where welfare or wages maximized, e.g. X is maximized at B on figure
2.9
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Figure 2.9: Effect of Patent Reforms on Welfare
way to increase world welfare while making patents stronger.
Initial parameters are important as welfare and wage functions are non monothonic
in degree of patent protection. Here the welfare analysis has nothing to do with more
product innovation, but with distribution of it.
2.4 Subsidies
Many developing countries are trying to embrace a more innovative economy, and what
they mean by that is they would like to do more product innovation. Policy mak-
ers are trying to implement policies that divert more resources to product innovation,
even though wisdom and success of such policies are increasingly being questioned
(Breznitz and Murphree (2011)). This model may explain the pitfalls a policy that
makes product innovation a priority in a country that specializes in process innovation
may face.
Suppose that government in South decides to subsidize product innovation only.
They announce that they will pay a certain share of research and development expendi-
ture that is made for product innovation. We will indicate the mentioned fraction with
u, where 0 ≤ u ≤ 1. Subsidies will be funded through lump-sum taxes. As a result
of such a selective subsidy, cost of producing a blueprint for a primary product will be
FS1 =
(1−u)fS
γS
, where as the cost of process innovation will stay the same as before,
FS2 =
fS
κ .
This modification of the system will alter the Free Entry Condition for South. Rel-
ative cost of product innovation declines, therefore we need to modify our free entry
condition RRS :
RRS =
λσ−1 (r + δ) γS
κ (r + ν + δ) (1− u)
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Figure 2.10: Subsidies in an Open Economy
This means an upward shift of RRS curve. Matching frontier will not be affected
by such a policy. Suppose that we are at an equilibrium where South is specialized on
Process innovation, whereas North does both kinds of innovation, namely we are on
part AB on equilibrium line in figure 2.4.
What figure 2.10 tells us that subsidies may not have any affect on what kind of
research being done in South, especially when North is doing both kinds of research11. It
is possible that it may push South to do both types of innovation when there is complete
specialization of research, but even then this will come at the expense of welfare loss
from such subsidies 12 . As a result we can say that not only that subsidies targeted
at product innovation may not work at all, even when they do their welfare effects will
not be clear cut.
2.5 Foreign direct investment
It is very hard to make an analysis on international patent agreements without tak-
ing Foreign Direct Investment into account. Many countries that are good at process
innovations, innovations that make it possible to produce goods cheaper, are also the
countries that are big recipients of foreign direct investment. One of the relevant issues
11I assume South will not be able to subsidize to the point RRS lie above RRN
12Size of consumer expenditure in South will be XS − Taxes, which is indirect utility as indicated in
(2.6). Higher taxes will mean a loss of welfare.
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here is the fact that many companies have been designing their products in one country
and producing the said product in another country. There are many factors affecting
foreign direct investment like political stability, institutions, geography, and there ex-
ists complicated scenarios involving creation of sophisticated supply chains requiring
subsidiaries in other countries. These are beyond the scope of this paper. But we can
look at the effects of an international patent reform on wages of workers, profits and
investment decisions of companies that operate on both national and multinational level
within the given framework.
First of all, the same framework we have created so far will apply here, but we
need to make some minor modifications. We will look into a case where companies in
North can innovate in North but have the option to choose between producing in either
North or South. As a result we will split the nNi into two more categories based on
where the goods are being produced, where i indicates if good is primary or secondary.
Some northern companies will be national companies, designing and producing in North
alone. They will be producing nNNi variety of goods. And some northern companies
will be multinational. They will design their products in North but will be producing
in South. They will produce nNSi variety of goods.
The process of finding the equilibrium flow rates (κ, ν) is same as before, and figure
(2.5) still applies . After finding the equilibrium (κ, ν), we can proceed and find the
equilibrium allocation of goods and wages.
We will look into the case where countries are completely specialized. As a result
North will do primary innovation whereas South will do process innovation. But when
it comes to production, South will be producing both types of goods whereas North will
specialize on producing Primary goods. Because of specialization we have the following
conditions:
nN1 = n1 = nN = nNN1 + nNS1
nS2 = n2 = nS
We will look into the case where without Foreign Direct Investment, wages in North
would be higher. Otherwise there would be no investment in South by foreign companies.
Thanks to Foreign Direct Investment, wages in North and South will equalize, hence
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wN = wS = w.
Since all the primary innovation is being done in North, equation (2.21) for total
number of goods will continue to hold as before, N = n1+n2 =
γN
δ zN . Total number of
goods depend only on how many innovators are allocated to primary allocation and all
the primary innovation is being done in North in complete specialization case. Likewise
the equations for n1 = nN and n2 = nS from equation (2.20) applies here as well:
n1 =
γN
δ + ν
zN , n2 =
νγN
δ (δ + ν)
zN
Prices for primary goods is indicated as p1 and p2 for secondary goods. In this
setting, prices do not depend on where goods are originated from, all what matters is
if they are primary or secondary goods. As described in equation (2.11), we find that
p1 = µw and p2 = µλw as a result of monopolies maximizing their profits. Respective
demand functions are derived as cj = Xp
−σ
j for each good j. It is c1 = X(µw)
−σ for
primary goods, and c2 = X(µλw)
−σ for secondary goods.
Finally, the solution to equilibrium in this economy will depend on following three
equations:
1− zN = nNN1c1
1− zS = nNS1c1λ+ nS2c2
1 = nNN1p1 + nNS1p1 + nS2p2 (2.24)
First two equations are resource constraints for production in North and South. Last
line is the condition that price index is equal to one.
Using p1 = µw and p2 = µλw, we can express last line of equation (2.24) as:
(µw)1−σ
(
nNN1 + nNS1 + nS2λ
1−σ
)
= 1
From this equation we can derive the equation for w:
w =
(
nNN1 + nNS1 + nS2λ
1−σ
)1/(σ−1) 1
µ
(2.25)
The effects of implementation of a stronger intellectual property rights scheme is
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easier to deduct in case of foreign direct investment. As before, a stronger patent system
will not increase the total number of goods as this number depends on the number of
innovators working for primary innovation and number of product innovators simply
equals to number of researchers in North. But such a policy will decrease the flow
rate κ for southern innovators as shown on figure 2.8, hence increasing the number of
primary goods while decreasing the number of secondary goods equally. That means
number of primary goods nN1 = nNN1 + nNS1 will increase but number of secondary
goods nS2 will decrease. Since λ
1−σ > 1, implication of this is a decline in worldwide
wages as the expression in right hand side of equation (2.25) decreases.
Next we will look into how decisions of northern companies on location of their pro-
duction facilities is affected by such a policy reform. Specifically we want to understand
how nNN1 and nNS1 are affected by stronger patent reforms.
Once more we will refer to equation (2.24), but first two lines. To keep things
simpler, we will assume zN = zS = z as before. Then using price equations p1 = µw and
p2 = µλw and corresponding demand functions c1 = X (µw)
−σ and c2 = X (µwλ)
−σ,
we get:
1− z = X (µw)−σ nNN1
1− z = X (µw)−σ
(
nNS1 + nS2λ
1−σ
)
We can easily derive the condition:
nNN1 = nNS1 + nS2λ
1−σ
This equation tells us that everything else equal, there is a positive correlation
between how many goods being produced in North nNN1 and number of goods being
produced in South, nS2. Finally using the fact that nN = nNN1 + nNS1, we find the
how the distribution for northern companies’ production will be across countries:
nNS1 =
nN − nS2λ
1−σ
2
nNN1 =
nN + nS2λ
1−σ
2
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As indicated before, values for nN and nS2 = nS can be found from equation (2.20) as
nN =
γN
δ+ν zN and nS2 =
νγN
δ(δ+ν)zN .
13These two equations tell us that as number of goods
being produced by northern companies (nN ) increase and number of goods produced by
southern companies (nS) decline, northern companies will shift their production more
to South (nNS1) while there will be less and less variety of goods (nNN1) being produced
in North.
A stronger patent system will exactly do that: it will increase nN while decreasing
nS. The results will be same as described above. More northern companies will shift
their production to South. This result is parallel to findings by Branstetter et al. (2006)
and Bilir (2011)14. They demonstrate that producers in USA increase their foreign
direct investment as developing countries implement stricter patent laws and they are
protected more against imitation in these countries. The mechanism for rising levels of
FDI as a result of stronger patent laws is a little different here. We get an increase in
foreign direct investment by Northern producers despite the fact that the probability of
being replaced by a southern producer is not affected by where you locate the production
facilities of your goods. The reason for the rise in the level of foreign direct investment
in this model is loss of manufacturing in the South as a result of stronger patent laws.
Strict IPRs will limit the rate of imitation in the South, therefore causing a decline in
the level of manufacturing and wage level in the South. This will cause the Northern
companies to move their manufacturing operations to the South, and as a result wages
in the North will also be driven down.
13Since we can not have negative number of goods being produced in one country, I will make the
assumption nN > nSλ
1−σto begin with. In complete specialization case, I will assume that there
are sufficiently high number of goods produced by northern companies relative to goods produced by
southern companies.
14Bilir (2011) finds that patents matter more for products that has long product life cycles, products
that become obsolete less frequently. In our model, all goods have the same rate of being obsolete, δ.
Chapter 3
Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper I show how the specialization patterns in R&D arise between countries.
Previous product cycle literature have taken the difference between countries as given,
by assuming developed countries doing the novel product innovation while developing
countries just imitating them. I first take R&D as a decision of choosing between
conducting novel-product innovation or follow-up process innovation, a decision that
is available to residents of both developed and developing nations. Then I show that
different equilibria other than complete specialization of countries is possible. Even
though developed countries have comparative advantage in novel product innovation
and developing countries have comparative advantage in follow-up process innovation,
there are equilibria where countries do not specialize and conduct both types of research
at the same time. The only catch is that both developed and developing countries can
not conduct both types of R&D simultaneously. One group of countries has to specialize
on what they have comparative advantage at. The implication of this result is that,
in the case of developed countries conducting both kinds of R&D, developing countries
will not be conducting any novel-product innovation since it will not be profitable to do
so.
Policy implications of existence of diverse equilibria are many. First of all, if devel-
oped nations are conducting both product and process types of R&D, stronger IPRs
will not decrease the rate developing countries imitate. In the case world economy is
completely specialized like it is in product cycle literature, stronger IPRs may improve
the world wide product innovation levels only if they are drastic enough to push South
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to commit resources to product innovation; otherwise their effects will only be distribu-
tive. Stronger IPRs in case of complete specialization will worsen the terms of trade for
developing countries, and will be more likely to hurt these countries more. In contrast,
in case of incomplete specialization, stronger IPRs will hurt developing countries only if
they hurt developed countries first. Lastly, subsidies to product innovation in develop-
ing countries will not work in case of incomplete specialization where developed nations
are conducting both kinds of R&D1.
Finally I show how foreign direct investment is affected by stronger IPRs policies. If
developed countries can set up production facilities in developing nations, their invest-
ment levels in foreign countries will respond positively to stronger IPRs in case countries
specialize in R&D they conduct. Worldwide wages and welfare will be negatively af-
fected by stronger IPRs laws.
1Assuming subsidy levels can not be high enough to provide comparative advantage in product
innovation to developing nations
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Appendix A
Proofs
A.1 Optimal Patents in Closed Economy
Matching frontier equation and free entry condition give us the following conditions:
(mκ)1/(1−α) =(mν)1/(−α)
1 =
λσ−1 (r + δ) γ
κ (r + ν + δ)
These two allow us to solve for (κ, ν). Then we get the following condition from flow
rates (2.8):
κ =
νγ
δ + ν
z1
z2
(A.1)
Using equation (A.1) and z1 + z2 = z we get:
z1 =
κ(δ + ν)
κ(δ + ν) + νγ
z, z2 =
νγ
κ(δ + ν) + νγ
z (A.2)
Using steady state flow equations n1(δ + ν) = γz1, n2δ = κz2 and equation (A.2),
we obtain the values for n1 and n2:
n1 =
κγ
κ(δ + ν) + νγ
z, n2 =
κνγ
δ (κ(δ + ν) + νγ)
z
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N =
κγ (δ + ν)
δ (κ(δ + ν) + νγ)
z
Using resource constraint and price normalization we get:
1− z = n1c1 + n2c2λ
P = 1 = p1n1 + p2n2
Solving for this equations and inserting appropriate price and demand functions give
us the solution for manufacturing wages and welfare in terms of n1 and n2:
w =
(
n1 + n2λ
1−σ
) 1
σ−1
1
µ
X =
(
n1 + n2λ
1−σ
) 1
σ−1 (1− z)
Substituting for n1 and n2 we can find the complete closed solution for X as follows:
X = (1− z)µ
[ (
δ + νλ1−σ
)
γκ
δ (κ (δ + ν) + νγ)
z
] 1
σ−1
We know that in a closed economy, implementation of stronger patents (an increase
in m in matching equation (2.7)) result in a decline in ν and increase in κ. This can be
seen from figure 2.6. Hence we can say
∂ν
∂m
< 0 and
∂κ
∂m
> 0
Then taking the derivative of X wrt m:
∂X
∂m
=
∂X
∂ν
∂ν
∂m
+
∂X
∂κ
∂κ
∂m
Taking these derivatives, we get ∂X∂κ > 0 ∀ (ν, κ) > 0. Then when
∂X
∂ν < 0, we know
for sure ∂X∂m > 0. We get the following condition when we take the derivative:
∂X
∂v
> 0 iff κ >
γ
(λ1−σ − 1)
42
If this condition holds, we know for sure patents will positively affect welfare. Oth-
erwise effects of a patent policy will be ambiguous.
A.2 Optimal Patents in Open Economy
A.2.1 Incomplete Specialization
We are looking at the case where North is conducting both kinds of research. Matching
frontier equation and free entry condition for North give us the following conditions:
(mκ)1/(1−α) =(mν)1/(−α)
1 =
λσ−1 (r + δ) γN
κ (r + ν + δ)
Using flow equations κz2 = νn1, n1 (δ + ν) = γz1 and z1 + z2 = zN + zS we find:
z1 = zN1 =
κ(δ + ν) (zN + zS)
κ(δ + ν) + νγN
, z2 =
νγN (zN + zS)
κ(δ + ν) + νγN
To simplify things, we will assume zN = zS = z. We can find the allocation of
secondary researchers between South and North as follows:
zN2 = z − zN1 =
z (νγN − κ (δ + ν))
κ(δ + ν) + νγN
, zS2 = z
Finally we can derive the values for nN1,nN2, nS2 and N(total number of goods)
using distribution of researchers and flow equations:
n1 = nN1 =
γNz1
δ + ν
=
κγN2z
κ(δ + ν) + νγN
, n2 =
κz2
δ
=
κνγN2z
δ (κ(δ + ν) + νγN )
nS2 =
κzS2
δ
, nN2 = nS2 =
κzN2
δ
=
κz (νγN − κ (δ + ν))
δ (κ(δ + ν) + νγN )
Using resource constraints for both North and South manufacturing and price nor-
malization equation we get the following equations for manufacturing wages w and
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welfare X:
1− zS = nS2Xλ
1−σ (µwS)
−σ
1− zN = nN1X (µwN )
−σ + nN2Xλ
1−σ (µwN )
−σ
1 = (µwN )
1−σ nN1 + (µλwN )
1−σ nN2 + (µλwS)
1−σ nS2
Solving for wages and welfare we find:
X = (1− z)
[(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
+
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ]σ/(σ−1)
wN =
[(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
+
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ]1/(σ−1) (
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
wS =
[(
nN1 + nN2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
+
(
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ]1/(σ−1) (
nS2λ
1−σ
)1/σ
Implementation of a stronger patent reform (increasing m) will result in a decline in
ν but an increase in κ. Therefore we have a similar case as we had for Closed Economy:
∂ν
∂m
< 0 and
∂κ
∂m
> 0
As a result of stricter IPRs, we will have North committing more resources on
primary innovation. South will continue on committing all of its resources on process
innovation. As a result we have:
∂nN1
∂m
=
∂nN1
∂ν
∂ν
∂m
+
∂nN1
∂κ
∂κ
∂m
> 0
∂nN2
∂m
=
∂nN2
∂ν
∂ν
∂m
+
∂nN2
∂κ
∂κ
∂m
< 0
∂nS2
∂m
=
∂nS2
∂ν
∂ν
∂m
+
∂nS2
∂κ
∂κ
∂m
> 0
Finally going the same route we find that N is an increasing with stronger patents.
n2 = nN2 + nS2 is a inverse u shaped function of patent protection. n2 is maximized
when ν2 = δλ1−σ (1 + δ).
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A.2.2 Complete Specialization
We get the equilibrium values for (ν, κ) from matching function and Specialization
curves:
(mκ)1/(1−α) =(mν)1/(−α)
κ =
νγN
δ + ν
zN
zS
We know that z1 = zN and z2 = zS . From equation (2.20) we get the values for n1
and n2:
n1 =
γN
δ + ν
zN
n2 =
νγN
δ (δ + ν)
zN
Inserting those values into equation (2.23) will give us the solution this model:
X = (1− z)

(γNz)1/σ
(
δ + ν1/σλ
1−σ
σ
)
((δ + ν) δ)1/σ


σ
σ−1
µwN =
(
γNz
δ + ν
)1/σ(γNz)1/σ
(
δ + ν1/σλ
1−σ
σ
)
((δ + ν) δ)1/σ


1
σ−1
µwS =
(
νγNz
(δ + ν)δ
)1/σ(γNz)1/σ
(
δ + ν1/σλ
1−σ
σ
)
((δ + ν) δ)1/σ


1
σ−1
We know that ∂ν∂m < 0 from figure 2.8.
After taking the appropriate derivatives we find the following conditions:
• ∂X∂m = 0 when ν = λ
−1, and second derivative is negative.
• ∂wS∂m = 0 when ν > δ(σ − 1) + λ
(σ−1)/σν1/σσ, and second derivative is negative
• ∂wN∂m = 0 when λν
3/2 (σ − 1)+ δνσ−λν1/σδ > 0, and second derivative is negative
